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lliE SUPREME COURT

OF lliE SI'ATE OF UI'AH

------------------------------ANNI KRISI'ENSEN'

Respondent,
BRIEF ON APPEAL

vs.

Case No. 15531

POUL ERIK KRISTENSEN,
Appellant.

NATURE OF TilE CASE

This is an Appeal by the Defendant/Appellant fran an Order
of the District Court wherein said Court refused to modify a Decree of
Divorce with regard to the custody of the parties minor children.
DISPOSITION

rn

TilE ID\-JER. COURT

Following a tw:J day trial, the lower court, by the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, awarded care, custody and control of the parties 1 f =
minor children to the plaintiff.

Approximately six weeks following the

entry of the aforesaid Decree of Divorce, the Defendant filed his M::>tion
for Mxlification of said Decree, seeking custody of the minor children.
1

Again following a tw:J day hearing on Defendant s Motion, Judge James S.
Sawaya, failing to find change of circumstances, or good cause warranted
1

by the best interest of the children, denied the Defendant s M::>tion,
said denial being the subject matter of this Appeal.
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NATUFE OF RELIEF SOUGHI' ON APPFAL

Respondent seeks affirmation of the Order of the District Cot
denying the Appellant's MJtion to MJdify the Decree of Divorce pertair~
to the care, custody, and control of the minor children of the parties

which by said Decree had been reposed with the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF TI1E FACTS

Following several months of extrenely cruel treatrr.ent which
forced the Plaintiff to leave her home in fear for her personal safety
(R. 50) st:<c

o __

-~~ 2

:;cmplaint seeking a Divorce.

(R. 2-3)

P.n inordin·

ately long oe.i..ay er..st:.ed wherein the parties sought relief pertaining tc
custody of the parties' four minor children culminating in a trial, thE
Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding, on the 7th and 8th days of April, 19;
(R. 38-39)

The issue of custody of the parties' children was pursued i

great detail as evidenced by the witnesses called by the parties to teo
tify regarding said issue.

On April 12, 1977, Judge Banks ordered:

"Custody of the children is awarded to the rrother with
very liberal visitation to the Defendant to include
the Defendant have the children for one month during
the sumner (no support to be paid during that: time)."
(R. 40)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and a Decree of Divorce in con·
formit"'J with Judge Bank's decision were entered on the 24th day of M3.y,
1977.

(R. 50-61)
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Owing to the apparent

efforts of the parties to "poison the

well" the Court found it necessary to enter the following finding:
"The Court feels it reasonable and finds that the
best interest of the parties and of their children
will be served by an affinnative order requiring cooperation with one another as to matters of visitation and an order restraining the parties fran discussing with the children or with third persons
other than their attorneys or professional counselors, the difficulties existing bebNeen the parties
and the circumstances giving rise to the divorce or
the frustrations or inadequacies which either of the
parties may feel as a result thereof. (R. 53 & R. 61)
Between the time when the Plaintiff was forced fran the marital abode and the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the Defendant refused
to pemit the Plaintiff to have reasonable visitation with the parties'
three oldest children (the youngest child then residing with the Plaintiff) , and notwithstanding efforts by the Plaintiff to obtain custody
of the three oldest children, the Court, by Judge Dean E. Conder, ordered
that the Defendant should have custody of the three oldest children during the pendancy of the divorce action.

(R. 26-27)

In total dL"Tegard for the Court's Order as contained in the

Decree of Divorce, the Defendant refused to tender custody of the children to the Plaintiff, tliDs precipitating a Motion for an Order to Show
Cause being brought before Judge Banks on the 7th day of J1..me, 1977, together with a Motion to Amend or Alter the Decree of Divorce (R. 43-47)
Judge Banks on said occasion made the following statement:
"You turn those children over. You (Mr. Kristensen)
turn those children over to the IIDther. There is no
doubt in the Court's mind tb.at vou have been influencing the children, because I ~ ~~e youngest boy does
not have the capacity to make the decisions that he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did and there's no doubt in my mind that you are the
one' that caused the children to be placed in protective
custodv. There's absolutely no question that she is
going to have those children, and if either of you c:se
those children to get back at the other the Court Wlll
put the offending party in jail. And I ' 11 make it
mighty difficult on you and I want you to know that."
(R. 162-163)
At the conclusion of the aforesaid Hearing, Judge Banks ordered the DE·
fendant ao imnediately comply with the Decree of Divorce.

(R. 70-71)

Thereafter, on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, the PlaiJ:.
tiff finally obtained, pursuant to an Order of the Cou.rt, physical custody of the children.
going effort tc

Within one rronth thereof the Defendant in his or

corc:~---:t.u=

::-:.t' ?exatious nature of the divorce

filed his "}btior: i...1 :-e ContSllpt and to Order Visitation"
Prior to hearing on said

~tion

proceedir~

(R. 75-81)

the Plaintiff tendered custody of the

children to the Defendant for the purpose of the one month sumner visi:
ation as contSllplated l.ID.der the Decree of Divorce.

While the childrer:

'vere in the custody of the Defendant, the Defenda."'lt caused to be filec
his "Motion to M::ldify Decree of Divorce" on the 20th day of July, 1977
(R. 83-84)

And thereafter refused to tender the children back to the

custodial parent, the Respondent herein.
On August 25, 1977, the rratter aga.in came before Judge Banks

where.in the Court ordered that temporary custody of the three older
children should be rEID3Il.ded to the Defendant and the custody of the
yG\ID.ger child be reptJsed in the Pla.intiff.

The :natter was t.l-ten set

for trial on the 20th day of Septe:nber, 1977, and Judge Banks concludec
his Order by the follov.ring edict:
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"This tenporary order is not to influence the Court
which hears the matter. It will be without prejudice
or advantage to either party." (R. 102)
A Custody Evaluation was filed with the al::ove entitled Court
on August 26, 1977, and the Order to Show Cause in re M:Jdification was
then heard by the Honorable James S . Sawaya on the 20th day of September, 1977 (less than six m:mths after the tiD day trial of the Divorce)
again several witnesses were elicited by the Defendant both with regard
to the custody evaluation and in support of Defendant 1 s position regarding MJdification of the Decree of Divorce.

On the 27th day of September,

1977, Judge Sawaya ordered that the llition to MJdify the Decree of Divorce as to custody of the minor children be denied.

Said Order being

entered by Judge Sawaya on the lOth day of Nov611ber, 1977, together with
an Order denying the Defendant 1 s llition to Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 128).
The Defendant then filed his Notice of Appeal on the 21st day
of November, 1977.

The Defendant (R. 131) filed a Motion to Stay Judge

Sawaya' s Order during the pendancy of the Appeal which llition was denied
by Judge Sawaya on ~~e 12th day of Dec611ber, 1977.

(R. 139-141)

The

aforesaid Order provided in part :
1

"It is hereby Ordered as follows: (1) The defendant s
Motion for Stay pending appeal is denied. (2) That
the tenporary order of district Judge Banks shifting
custody of sane of minor children of the parties to
the defendant is dissolved. (3) That pursuant to the
Decree of Divorce plaintiff is to be restored custody
of all four ( 4) of the minor children of the parties."
(R. 140)
0/ot-.-Jitbstanding this Order, the Defendant failed and refused to tender
custody of the parties 1 boys over to the Plaintiff, and at the present
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

the two boys rana:in in the physical custody of the Defendant.

ARGl1MENI'
TI1E CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF TilE PARTIES MmJR
CHTI.DREN SHOULD CONI'llil'E TO BE VESTED rn THE RESPONDENI'.
Probably one of the IOCJst important and salient factors and
yet possibly overlooked wi.thin the context of this IOCJst unfortunate
and endless litigation is found in the Defendant's '1-btion for Stay
Pending Appeal" (R. 117-118). The statement has questionable materiality to that 'JC:C'::..c.~o.:: ~,xction but sets forth succinctly the Defendant's conter::pt £:;:- :!:"le C=ts.

In referring to the custody of boys

Erik and Alan the fcllowir,g statenent appears:
" . . . and allow the Order insofar as it places
custodv of Erik and Alan to remain in effect and
to allaw those children to remain with the Defendant on the grounds that the said children, Erik
and Alan Kristensen, have expressed their desire
to live with the Defendant, that they resided rNith
the Defendant for 17 of the last 18 IOCJnths . . . 11
(EiliphaSis Added)
That statenent was made on the 29th day of Sept6llber, 1977.
proper accounting

~d

Today a

show that notwithstanding Court Decrees and

Orders to the contrary the Defendant has retained custody of the boys
for 24 of the last 25 !OCJTiths.
The above cirC\.1liJStances find a striking similarity in the ca:
of Watts v. Watts, 445 P.2d 141, 21 Ut.2d 306 (1968).

In that case trn

non-custodial parent filed a petition for IOCJdification of a divorce de·
cree that had been entered but a couple of IOCJTiths previous seeking a
change of custody of the parties' minor cbild.

The court found that
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not only had the non-custodial parent failed to show any substantial
change in circumstances justifying IIDdification but that the said noncustodial parent had in several respects ignored the provisions of said
decree.

In so finding the court stated:

"- it is rather 1.mconscionable to conclude that such
1IDilateral change in circumstances could inure to the
benefit of a conceited defaulter."
In the present case the defendant not only refused the plaintiff access
to her children prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce but upon the

entry of the same Defendant continued to deprive Plaintiff of custody of
the children forcing the Plaintiff to seek court sanctions to obtain physical custody of the children.
The court in Watts v. Watts, supra, continued its findings
which again have direct relation to the facts in the present action:
''Many children are unhappy at home, as were Tan and
Huck, which is a good reason only to say they are liDhappy at home. Discipline is something else, which
a trial court rrust learn to spell 'Nithout necessarily
equating the tenn with 'Lmhappy'. We t..lU.nk the trial
court did a pretv; good job of equating - especially
since the facts reflect at least a possible surmize
that the Pied Piper was lurking in the shadows - not
with a 'Nhistle, perhaps, but myhap with tempting ice
cream cones or toy space ship."
Again, the similarity is striking to the present case wherein the plaintiff had only had the custody of the children for one IIDDth prior to
turning the children over to the defendant for their stmner visitation,

whereupon defendant again refused to turn the children over to the plaintiff and instituted his IIDtion for :mdification of decree.

As Judge

Banks stated, there is considerable evidence that the defendant had engaged
in similar "Pied Piper" activities.
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It is a well settled legal premise within the jurisdiction c
the State of Utah that a petition or ITDtion for !IDdification of a dive
decree is, and especially with reference to custody of minor children,
is an equitable proceeding.

It is also well settled that the petitior.

is required to show substantial or material "changed circumstances" fr
those that existed at the time the court entered its prior order or de
cree.

Without such a prerequisite, the bitter and errotional contest e

tered into between t:m litigants in a divorce action could drag on in"21<= ~se of Crofts v. Crofts, 445 P. 2d 701, 21 Ut. 2d 332,

definatel;,
establishe~

r.::-,e ::1eec for "Finalization" within the scope of the contin.

ing jurisdiction of the dcmestic relation courts of the State of Utah.
In referring to the finality of a judgment regarding the disposal of

children or the distribution of property, the court describes subsequa
changes as follows:
"This, however requires sane good cause based upon a
change of circumstances for ITDdifying the decree and
cannot be done by interpreting the language therecf.
Litigation IllUSt be put to an end, and it is the function of a final ju.clgi!lent to do just that. A judgment
is the final consideration in determination of a court
on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding.
(49 C.J.S. Judgments §1)"
As stated above "JudgJ:nent" in the present action was entered by the abf

entitled court following a two day trial on the 24th day of May, 1977.
Less than t:m rrrmths subsequent, the defendant filed his fution to MJd:.
the Decree (July 15, 1977), requesting change of custody of the childr<
fran the plaintiff to himself.

(R. 83)

Notwithstanding the defendant

failure to set forth the change of circumstances and in particular the
"good cause" upon which he based his ITDtion, t.1.e lower court provided
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the defendant with a second opportunity within a six rrx:mth time span
to again present evidence in substantiation of his re=ing claim.
Again the court fmmd in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as to the issue of custody of the parties' minor children.
It is therefore apparent that the "Conm:m Sense Finality" rule espoused by the court in Crofts v. Crofts, supra, demands application
to the present case.
Another generally accepted legal pranise espoused by the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah deals with the discretion and latitude grant:=d to the trial court in assessing the many factors pertinent
to an award of custody in divorce litigation.

Although this discretion

is not unimpeachable, it is nevertheless, one that by the very nature

of the issues confronted rrrust be and is Employed by the Supreme Court
of this State.

In Robinson v. Robinson, 391 P.2d 434, l5 Ut.2d 293

(1964), the Court fmmd as follows:
"As we have often observed, on appeal, it is advisable

to allow considerable latitude of discretion to the
trial court in such matters because of his advantage
position to judge the personalities and characters of
th_ose involved."
See also Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 993 (1975), and Hyde v. Hyde, 454 P.2d
884, 22 Ut. 2d 429 (1969).

In the case of Weiss v. Weiss, 469 P.2d

504, 24 Ut.2d 236 (1970), Justice Henroid in dissenting opinion thereto
took umbrage with the majorit:r opinions position relative to the trial
court's

discreti~

by stating as follows:

''They (referring to the main opinion's reference. to
the discretion granted the lower court) are platltudes
that '-lllrealistically are not supportive of the preponSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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derance of the evidence, and in rendering lip service
thereto, it seems to me, is a rnyoptic appraisal of the
findings of fact of not only one but ~ district court
judges and they do not take into account what the main
opinion claims we sb.ould do, - give due 'allowance for
the advantaged position of the trial judge: . "
Again, in the present case, two district court judges within the time
span of less than six IIDnths heard the best evidence that the Defendant
could produce in an effort to sustain his position regarding custody
the best evidence that the plaintiff could produce

to

an~

sustain her

pcsition with regard to the custody of the parties' minor children and
both conc2.t:C.ec J.:_:_,z" t!"'zt the "plaintiff" as the mother of said childre:
as a fit and ?::-e>per person to have the care, custody and control of said
children awar:ied to her subject to the right of the defendant to visit
said children at reasonable times and places and further stated:
" . . . the best interest of the children will be served by their being in the physical custody and care and
control of the plaintiff." (R. 50-51)
Again referring to the discretion of the trial judge, this
court in the case of Henderson v. Henderson, Supreme Court of the State
of Utah, March 1978, stated in referring to the trial judge:
"He is necessarily clothed with great discretion in
matters of this kind, and we carmot conclude that he
erred."
Notwithstanding the irrelevancy of the inuendos regarding the
relationship between the respondent and T..Jarren Alphonse Mulder, as described in the Appellant's Brief, there does not appear in the record
any evidence 'tihatsoever that the relationship between the Respondent
and Mr. Mulder in any way inhibits the Respondent fran perfo=ing r..'-le
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maternal needs of the parties' minor children.

In fact, insaruch as

the Respondent and Me. Mulder are now wife and husband, and insofar as
Me. Mulder is in a position to support and maintain both the Plaintiff

and the minor children, the Plaintiff is in a far superior position to
provide for the best interests and needs of the children, whereas the
Appellant lllUSt look to external =e for the children while he is pursuing his livelihood.

It is also interesting to note haw much reliance the Appellant
places on the Custody Evaluation as filed with the lower court.

It is

obvious that such an evaluation conducted after three of the four minor
children have been in the physical custody of the Appellant for 17 of
the preceeding 18 months, could have any validity whatsoever in light
of Judge Banks' finding that the Defendant had engaged in substantial
efforts to "poison the well".

Tc 1.mderstand the minor children's atti-

tude toward Me. Mulder as expressed in their interviews in the Custody
Evaluation (R. 104) one must also investigate the malice and harrassrnent
exercised by the Defendant in bringing a lawsuit against Me. Mulder and
furthenrore which lead the defendant to have his o;.m children picked up
and placed in protective custody during the one month in the last !:'.venty
five months that the plaintiff has actually had physical custody of all
of the minor children (R. 163) .
CONCLUSION

This Court should affi= the trial court decisions of both
Judge Banks and Judge S3W8Ya by affirming Judge Sawctya' s Order denying
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Machine-generated OCR,
-11-may contain errors.

defendant's llition to llidify Decree of Divorce, said Order being in thE
best interests of the fm.rr minor children of the parties hereto.

Fur-

therarore, this Court should award to the Plaintiff her reasonable cost
incurred on this Appeal.
RESPECTFUllY SUBMI'ITED this I ~y of April, 1978.
CAlliSTER, GREENE &

Garv R.

EKER

owe

Atto
. s for Respondent
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: 531-7676
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CERTIFICATE OF M\ILlliG

I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief on Appeal in Case
No. 15531, first class postage prepaid to David S. Dolowitz of the
law fi= of Parsons, Behle & latimer, 79 South State Street, P.O. Box

11898, Salt I...a.ke City, Utah 84147, att=ey for Appellant, Paul Erik
Kristensen.
DATED this

/~day

of April, 1978.

ATI'ORNEY
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